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evidence" the court leaves a possibility, however, for review of the
agency's opinion.
In conclusion, there will probably not be any more cases in which
the circuit court judge makes a trip to the property to determine if
it would be a good place to have a shopping center.'5 Permissible
scope of judicial review will be on the basis of:
1. Action in excess of granted powers with a presumption of a
lack of any power not explicitly enumerated by the legislature.
2. Lack of procedural due process with a requirement that the
statute itself enumerate a procedure which meets the standards
of due process quite apart from whether due process was in
fact achieved in the case.
3. Lack of substantial evidentiary support, i.e., whether evidence
was heard and whether there is any evidence to support the
finding, or whether a reasonable man could reach the same
conclusion.
It is submitted that this will make zoning board rulings extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to overturn. This is regrettable since it
grants power to effectively take the most profitable uses of private
property without the judicial restraint which the legislature intended
when it enacted the KRS 100.057 de novo provision. Hopefully, when
the proper case arises, the court will construe review on the "clearly
erroneous" question to permit some latitude of judgment as to the
weight of the evidence presented to the board.
Courtney F. Ellis
TOTs-I i r v'ENwG CAusE-FonxsABrY.- The plaintiff sustained
injuries when she fell through a trap door left open by a tenant in
the unlighted hallway of a building. The plaintiff claimed that the
negligence of the defendant, the owner of the building, in failing to
light the passageway, was a concurring proximate cause of her in-
juries. Held: Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed with directions
that the defendant be given a judgment n. o. v. "Granted that appel-
lant may have been negligent in failing to keep the passageway
lighted, the independent act of negligence by the tenant, without
which the accident could not have occurred, was an act the appellant
15 Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Coznm'n v. Cope,
318 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1958).
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could not reasonably have been expected to foresee." Bengold Prop-
erties, Inc. v. Crook, 377 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1964).
Kentucky has a rule which is as workable as most rules of law
in this difficult field, but the court is inconsistent in its application of
the rule. In order for an intervening cause to bar recovery in Ken-
tucky, it must be a superseding cause.1 It is a superseding cause and
the first actor is not liable if the intervening cause is unforeseeable.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held an intervening act to be
unforeseeable if it was unusual and extraordinary.2 Where the inter-
vening cause was common and ordinary, the court has held otherwise.3
The Kentuckly rule resembles the American Law Institute's old
view as stated in Restatement of Torts, Sec. 442(b). The Institute
took the position that in determining whether an intervening force
is a superseding cause, it is important to consider whether its opera-
tion appears, after the event, to be extraordinary rather than normal
in view of the circumstances. 4 The Kentucky rule was stated as fol-
lows in Hines v. Westerfield:5
To be proximate cause, a cause is not required to be the last link in
the chain of events. An act or force may intervene without breaking
the chain of cause and effect, so long as the intervening force or act is
not the superseding cause.
If the original act set in force a chain of events which the original
negligent actor might have reasonably foreseen would, according to the
experience of mankind, lead to the event which happened, the original
actor is not relieved of liability by the intervening act.6
'Louisville & N. R.R. et al. v. Powers, 255 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1953); Hines
v. Westerfield, 254 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1953).2 Carr v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 301 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. 1957) (negligence of
defendant in rigging a high tension wire close to the ground superseded by
decedent's deliberate act of attempting to put up a television antenna next to it);
Dixon v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 295 Ky. 32, 174 S.W.2d 19 (1943) (gross
negligence of an automobile operator).
3 Ambrosius Industries v. Adams, 293 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1956) (defendant's
negligence in rigging a load was not superseded by the negligence of the second
defendant in loading it); Criswell v. City of Jackson, 257 Ky. 222, 77 S.W.2d
622 (1934) (where defendant city allowed rock pile to remain on the street its
negligence was a concurring cause of injuries sustained by a pedestrian when a
negligently driven truck was diverted from its path by the rock pile); City of
Bowling Green v. Peterson, 199 Ky. 311, 251 S.W. 187 (1923) (where truck-
load of fodder brushed up against a negligently maintained pole, city, could
reasonably have anticipated that a vehicle wolud brush against it); Brown v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 135 Ky. 798, 123 S.W. 298 (1909) (acts of third persons
in putting in motion an unlocked turntable, whereby a child was injured, was held
not to relieve the railroad from liability for its negligence in failing to make it
secure); United States Natural Gas Co. v. Hicks, 134 Ky. 1, 119 S.W. 166 (1909)
(where defendant negligently maintained a gate valve he could reasonably fore-
see that a child would ignite the leaking gas with a match).4 0berst, Recent Developments in Torts, 46 Ky. L.J. 193, 201 (1958).




In that case the defendant's car was parked so as to protrude into
the street. The court said it was unforeseeable to the defendant that
a third car would be forced to the other side of the road and cause
the plaintiff to drive into a ditch. It was held to be a superseding
cause. By comparing the Hines case to one which was decided a short
time before, Bosshammer v. Lawton,7 it is easy to see that the appli-
cation of the Kentucky rule of intervening cause is very uncertain.
In the Bosshammer case, the defendant left his car standing on the
traveled portion of the highway opposite the entrance to a public
garage at the base of an icy hill, in violation of a statute. The court
held it was foreseeable that a third party would pull his automobile
out onto the highway from the garage in front of the plaintiff who
was proceeding down the hill, causing the plaintiff to run into the
third party.
As precedent, these two cases, like most Kentucky cases on inter-
vening cause, must be limited narrowly to their facts. All that can be
concluded from the two cases is that the court thought it not fore-
seeable under the circumstances of the Hines case that a motorist
might be driving on the wrong side of the road, while in the Boss-
hammer case it thought it foreseeable that a person might pull out
in front of another car. There is a valid distinction between the two
cases. The negligence of the defendant in the Bosshammer case was
thought to create a greater risk, because his car covered a greater
portion of the highway and because the highway was icy.
Valid though the distinction is, it is minute when one considers
the fact that in Bosshammer the negligent actor was held to answer
in damages and in Hines he escaped liability completely. The distinc-
tion becomes a greater problem when one considers that such distinc-
tions must serve as guidelines for trial courts and attorneys. These
are major policy considerations which should enter into the application
of the intervening cause rule. The rule should be applied so as to
place the loss on those who should justly bear the loss, and in such a
manner that trial courts can apply it with reasonable accuracy.
At the present time, if there is any degree of actual causation be-
tween the first actor's negligence and the injury, whether or not there
is legal causation is a toss up if there was an intervening cause. One
possible solution to this dilemma would be for the Kentucky court
to adopt the view now taken by the American Law Institute:
Where the actor's conduct creates or increases the risk of a particular
harm, and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the
harm is brought about by the intervention of another force does not
7 287 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1951).
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relieve the actor of liability, except where that force is the intentionally
tortious or criminal act of a third person. 8
According to comment b of See. 442B, it is immaterial to the
actor's liability that the harm is brought about in a manner which
no one in his position could possibly have been expected to foresee
or anticipate. The Restatement rule, if adopted by the court, would
give trial courts and lawyers a more concrete standard to work with
in dealing with cases involving intervening cause. The rule would lend
itself to a more consistent application than the present Kentucky rule.
Finally, it would force citizens to become more cognizant of the
dangers and traps which they, through their negligence, lay for an
ever increasing number of people likely to come into contact with
them.
If, however, the court considers the tentative Restatement rule too
harsh, it should at least widen the gap between those acts which it
considers to be foreseeable and those which it considers to be un-
foreseeable and hold only those truly extraordinary acts to be super-
seding causes.
Robert 1. Greene
CoNsTrrtTioNAL LAw-IGHT To CouNsL.-Danny Escobedo, a twenty-
two-year-old was arrested and taken to police headquarters for interro-
gation in connection with a fatal shooting. Escobedo made several re-
quests to see his lawyer which were denied even though the lawyer
was present in the building. The accused was not advised by the
police of his right to remain silent and, after persistent questioning by
the police, made a damaging statement which was admitted at the
trial. The state's highest court saw the confession as voluntary, and
sustained the conviction.' Held: Reversed.
Where .. . the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth
Amendment as made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that no statement elicited by the police during the
interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial. Eccobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
The question is when the right to counsel begins. Escobedo pro-
vides that it attaches when the police investigation has begun to
8 RESTATEZMNT (sEcoNm), TORTS § 442B (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
1 People v. Escobedo, 28 M. 2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
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